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This paper explores the links between macroeconomic developments, especially monetary policy,
and the exchange rate during the period of Japan’s bubble economy and subsequent stagnation. The
yen experienced epic gyrations over that period, starting with its rapid ascent after the March 1985
Plaza Accord of major industrial countries. Two distinct periods of endaka fukyo, or recession induced
by a strong yen, occurred in the late 1980s and the early 1990s at critical phases of the monetary policy
cycle. My approach emphasizes the interaction of short-term developments driven by monetary factors
(as they affect international real interest rate differentials) and the long-term determinants of the real
exchange rate’s equilibrium path. Chief among those long-run determinants are relative sectoral productivity
levels and the terms of trade, including the price of oil. Since the mid-1990s, the yen’s real exchange
rate has generally followed a depreciating trend and Japan’s comprehensive terms of trade have deteriorated.
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In the late 1980s, Japan’s economy embarked on a period of rapid escalation in the prices 
of shares and real estate. This “bubble economy” was followed by a collapse in asset 
values, a reduced pace of real economic growth, banking problems, and deflation.  Nearly 
two decades after the demise of the bubble economy, the prognosis for Japanese growth 
is again bleak amid a turbulent global economic outlook. Japan’s experience carries 
lessons for those hoping to understand and contain the 2007-09 financial crisis 
originating in the United States housing and financial markets. 
  Some observers of Japan blame its monetary policy for failing to react promptly 
and aggressively enough, both as asset prices exploded upward in the late 1980s and as 
they plummeted afterward. In these accounts, official concerns about the yen’s foreign 
exchange rate and the competitiveness of the export sector were significant 
considerations for monetary policy. Indeed, the yen has experienced epic gyrations since 
the mid-1980s, starting with its rapid ascent after the March 1985 Plaza Accord of major 
industrial countries. Two distinct periods of endaka fukyo, or recession induced by a 
strong yen, occurred in the late 1980s and the early 1990s at critical phases of the 
monetary policy cycle. In general, Japan’s real economic growth rate is rather strongly 
negatively correlated with the level of the yen’s real effective exchange rate, as illustrated 
in Figure 1. Over 1978-2007, the correlation coefficient between the real exchange rate 
and real GDP growth is −0.38. 
  Yet the determinants of the yen’s short- and even longer-term movements remain 
mysterious in light of the development of Japan’s macro economy. What factors, for 
example, can explain the yen’s steady and dramatic appreciation against the dollar over   2
the early 1990s as Japan’s real economy and its financial system deteriorated?  In their 
prominent study of the Japanese economy through 1997, McKinnon and Ohno (1997, p. 
2) go so far as to “treat the course of the yen-dollar exchange rate as a forcing variable for 
Japanese monetary policy, rather than assuming that monetary policy independently 
determines the exchange rate.” While the U.S.-Japan trade tensions that McKinnon and 
Ohno view as the underlying determinant of yen/dollar movements undoubtedly 
influenced market expectations, their vision of yen fluctuations that are largely 
exogenous with respect to macro policies begs the question of  how policymakers were 
able to direct market-determined exchange rates toward politically expedient levels.
1  
  This paper explores the links between macroeconomic developments, especially 
monetary policy, and the exchange rate during the period of Japan’s bubble economy and 
subsequent stagnation. My approach emphasizes the interaction of short-term 
developments driven by monetary factors (as they affect international real interest rate 
differentials) and the longer-term determinants of the real exchange rate’s equilibrium 
path. While I believe this approach to be fruitful, it raises further questions for future 
research as I describe below.  Hopefully this exploration will nonetheless throw light on 
the general question of how major currency misalignments emerge and recede. The 
narrative focuses on how monetary and goods-market factors interacted with the 
exchange rate, but there is no doubt that the health of Japan’s financial system was a 
critically important growth determinant during this period, in part through its effect on 
the monetary transmission mechanism. 
                                                           
1 As McKinnon and Ohno (1997) express their thesis elsewhere, “The erratically appreciating yen has been 
an independent (or exogenous) source of disturbance. And since 1984, at least, it has imposed undue 
deflation on the Japanese economy” (p. 199).    3
  The paper begins by reviewing the broad outlines of Japan’s monetary policy 
experience and the yen’s exchange-market behavior since the Plaza agreement of 1985.
2 
The paper then sets out a simple framework relating real interest differentials to the 
exchange rate, and uses it to explore the role of monetary policies.  
In the paper’s second half I focus on the longer-term determination of the real 
exchange rate, which informs the exchange rate forecasts underlying international real 
interest rate differentials. Specifically, I consider the evolution of the yen’s real exchange 
rate with reference to international and intersectoral productivity growth gaps, as posited 
by the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) model, and fluctuations in relative international 
prices for traded goods, including energy.   
The rationale for carefully analyzing the benchmark is that real appreciations in 
accord with the HBS prediction – those driven by relatively high productivity growth in 
export and import competing industries – should not entail lower profitability in the 
manufacture of tradable Japanese goods. The analysis shows, however, that yen real 
exchange rate movements against the United States dollar are not closely related to HBS 
factors over any reasonable medium term, and in fact are negatively correlated on a year-
to-year basis. Furthermore, year-to-year real yen depreciations are positively correlated 
with gains in competitiveness by Japanese exporters. (There is somewhat more evidence 
of a role for HBS factors against some nondollar currencies and on an effective basis). An 
important question is the extent to which sharp exchange rate movements have 
                                                           
2 A complementary study exploring this ground is Hamada and Okada (2007). Hamada and Okada 
sometimes verge on language seeming to imply an exogenous yen real exchange rate, which on their p. 17 
they  compare to “an outside temperature that Japan faced during these 20 years ….”  Elsewhere, however, 
they clarify their belief the yen exchange rate has reacted in part to domestic macro policies. Like 
McKinnon and Ohno they allude to trade conflict (through a theoretical analysis of current account targets), 
but place little emphasis on it in their detailed policy narrative. 
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themselves affected productivity levels in Japanese industry. Terms of trade movements, 
in particular fluctuations in global energy prices, are powerful correlates of changes in the 
yen’s real exchange rate: declines in the terms of trade tend to coincide with real yen 
depreciation.  
 
Overview of Japan’s Monetary Experience 
 
As the United States undertook a program of disinflation and fiscal expansion in the early 
1980s, the yen and other world currencies depreciated sharply against the United States 
dollar. After averaging below 220 yen per dollar over 1978-81 – that level itself a very 
sharp appreciation relative to the average of 288 over 1974-77 – the yen depreciated to 
about 250 in 1982, before assuming an average value of around 238 for 1983-85. These 
annual averages in exchange rates disguise very high intra-year volatility, however.  
Between March 1984 and February 1985, for example, the yen depreciated from 225.40 
to 260.24 against the dollar, a move of more than 14 percent (in log points). The dollar’s 
renewed strength reinforced trade tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners, and 
eventually led to the September 1985 Plaza Accord. The U.S. and four major allies – the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan – pledged concerted policy intervention to 
bring the dollar down. 
  The aftermath of the Plaza accord saw a dramatic move in the yen’s dollar 
exchange rate, as illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 displays the nominal yen/dollar 
exchange rate, quoted in yen per dollar but on an inverted scale so that a rise in the series 
is a nominal appreciation in the yen. The figure also plots two indexes of the yen’s real   5
exchange rate on a secondary vertical axis, with a rise in the index being a real yen 
appreciation. One real exchange rate series is the bilateral rate against the United States 
dollar, while the second is a trade-weighted multilateral (effective) index. Both of these 
real exchange rates are computed with respect to consumer price indexes, and they move 
reasonably closely together most of the time. The real effective CPI rate, in turn, is highly 
correlated with the real effective rate based on unit labor costs, shown in Figure 1.  
Having been around 260 yen per dollar in early 1985, the yen price of dollars had 
fallen to around 125 by early 1988, an appreciation of roughly 73 percent (in log points) 
over only three years. In its latter stages, the yen’s rise was encouraged by somewhat 
easier U.S. monetary policy immediately following the October 1987 stock market crash. 
Estimates such as those reported by Ahearne and others (2002) suggest that Japan’s GDP 
was below potential in 1986 and 1987 as exporters struggled. Very quickly, enyasu had 
become endaka. 
  Japan’s policy interest rates, having been raised abruptly late in 1985 to support 
the Plaza policy, were lowered sharply through 1986 and 1987. (See Figure 3.) From a 
high point above 8 percent in late 1985, the overnight call money rate fell to just above 3 
percent in the first half of 1987.  
Early in 1986, the prices of equity and land began to rise appreciably more 
sharply than in previous years. Although it was not understood at the time, this marked 
the start of the great Japanese stock market and real estate bubbles. Figure 4 shows the 
trajectories of land prices in six major cities and of the Nikkei stock-price average. All 
categories of real estate appreciated, but commercial properties far outpaced industrial 
and residential real estate, rising in price by more than 75 percent between 1986 and their   6
1991-92 market peak. In percentage terms, however, the bubble in stock prices was much 
more extreme.  The Nikkei 225 average rose from about 13,000 at the start of 1986 to 
about 39,000 at the end of 1989, when the bubble peaked. With the benefit hindsight, the 
steep price increases look wildly unsustainable. Yet the Bank of Japan did not raise 
interest rates until the bubble was roughly two and a half years old. 
Many observers, for example, Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001), Ahearne 
and others (2002), Ito and Mishkin (2006), and Hamada and Okada (2007), link the 
Japanese authorities’ policy response to the emerging asset bubble to policy dilemmas 
embedded in the macro landscape in the late 1980s. With the yen historically strong, 
output below potential, and inflation therefore quiescent in 1986-88 during this first 
episode of endaka fukyo, there was no appetite to restrict monetary policy in the hope of 
moderating asset-price inflation. Such action would have risked further yen appreciation, 
and, as McKinnon and Ohno (1997) argue, the wealth effect of the bubble may have 
moderated the growth slowdown that otherwise would have occurred. In addition, 
concurrent trade tensions with the United States discouraged Japanese authorities from 
contractionary macroeconomic actions that foreigners would perceive as increasing 
Japan’s current account surplus.
3 This seems an odd concern, because generally it is a 
weaker currency, not a stronger one, that inflicts beggar-thy-neighbor trade-volume 
effects on trade partners. I discuss possible drivers of the yen’s exchange rate below. 
The period was the first of several episodes in which Japan’s macro policies, 
perhaps lagging “behind the curve,” contributed to a sequence of destabilizing exchange 
rate movements that ultimately worsened the bubble and its aftermath. These episodes 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001, p. 421). 
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will be discussed in greater detail below. Okina and Shiratsuka (2002, p. 44), suggest that 
the monetary stance over 1986-88 might have fueled a “euphoric” expectation of 
“protracted low interest rates.”  
  Any such expectation was dashed in mid-1989, when the Bank of Japan finally 
did embark upon a cycle of sharply higher interest rates (see Figure 3).  The Nikkei 
continued to rise through the end of 1989, however, and the yen, which had stopped 
appreciating in 1988 and then reversed course, depreciated through April 1990. But, with 
inflation finally on the rise, the policy interest rate was to continue rising for almost a full 
year, eventually reaching a level of about 8.2 percent (again, see Figure 3). As described 
by Ito and Mishkin (2006, p. 136), the Japanese government in 1990 began to deploy 
regulatory and fiscal weapons to counteract the land bubble. Land prices peaked in 1991 
and declined relentlessly thereafter. By the end of 1990 the Nikkei stood at only around 
23,000 – a 41 percent decline from the stock bubble’s peak. By the summer of 1992 the 
Nikkei stood at around 16,000. 
  Real GDP growth, which had proceeded at an average rate of nearly 5.8 percent 
per year over 1988-90, slowed to 3.3 percent in 1991, to just under 1 percent I 1992, and 
to 0.2 percent in 1993. It collapsed to –2.4 percent in 1994. From its peak of over 8 
percent in the spring of 1991, the overnight call rate if interest fell to slightly over 2 
percent by the summer of 1994. Throughout this period, however, the yen appreciated 
strongly, so the economy was again in the grip of endaka fukyo. As output growth slowed 
and then turned negative, core inflationary pressures subsided, as shown in Figure 5 
(which does not adjust the Japanese CPI for two substantial increase in consumption   8
tax).
4 Events of this period have sparked debate about whether the Bank of Japan lowered 
interest rates sufficiently quickly.
5 I return to discuss the yen’s seemingly perverse 
appreciation, which continued through April 1995, below. Ito and Mishkin (2006, p. 138) 
state that the damaging appreciation occurred “with no apparent macrofundamental 
reasons ….” 
  In the early 1990s Japan’s financial sector came under increasing stress as a result 
of nonperforming loans, many extended to the construction and real estate sectors that 
were now suffering the effects of plummeting property values. Falling land and equity 
prices reduced the collateral available for new loans and tightened liquidity constraints, in 
a manner that has become all too familiar in recent years. Bank-sponsored mortgage 
lending companies called jusen had helped fuel the land bubble by lending aggressively 
to finance real estate development projects. They began to suffer in 1991 and after two 
failed rescue plans the government decided to close them in 1995. As far as the banks 
themselves were concerned, they too held mortgage loans; but in addition, stocks formed 
part of their assets, and a hefty percentage of unrealized capital losses counted against 
regulatory capital. To make matters worse, lightly regulated banks continued to extend 
credit to basically insolvent borrowers, thereby weakening their own balance sheets 
through a process of “evergreening.”  
Over 1992-95 some smaller institutions began to fail. Banking and credit 
problems were to escalate over the decade, and became especially acute in the latter 
                                                           
4 The tax increases (from 0 to 3 percent and from 3 to 5 percent, respectively) took place on April 1, 1989 
and April 1, 1997. The definition of core inflation that I use for Japan, reported by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communication, excludes the prices of food (other than alcoholic beverages) and energy. 
5 See Kuttner and Posen (2001), Mori, Shiratsuka, and Taguchi (2001), Okina and Shiratsuka (2002), and 
Ito and Mishkin (2006) for alternative views. According to Ito and Mishkin (p. 138), “the BOJ might have 
underestimated deflationary forces.”   9
1990s after the outbreak of the Asian emerging-market financial crisis in the summer of 
1997. The Ministry of Finance issued a deposit guarantee in 1995, and subsequently 
injected capital into banks in 1998-99 after the failures of three large Japanese banks, 
smaller banks, and securities firms starting late in 1997.
6  
The travails of the financial industry in Japan proved to be a serious drag on the 
economy, especially starting in the late 1990s; conversely, the stagnant economy 
impeded financial-sector recovery. Evergreening and government guarantees led to the 
survival of “zombie” firms and financial institutions, the continuing presence of which 
impeded restructuring and discouraged investment and productivity growth.
7 
Notwithstanding the difficulties the crippled financial system had in channeling credit to 
productive uses, the government did little to force a restructuring of banks’ balance sheets 
until late in 2002.  
  Buttressed in part by the depreciating yen, output growth recovered somewhat 
between the second half of 1995 and the first quarter of 1997. Core inflation continued 
slowly to decline (Figure 5). In April 1997 the government implemented two 
preannounced but contractionary fiscal moves, an increase in the consumption tax from 3 
to 5 percent and the withdrawal of a temporary income tax cut. In the second half of the 
year, the Asian emerging-market financial crisis erupted, contributing to a fall in demand 
and to the financial instability described earlier.  
The yen appreciated in both nominal and real terms between August 1998 and 
December 1999, a development that placed a further drag on the economy (Figure 2). In 
                                                           
6 See Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) for an extensive discussion. 
7 For a theoretical model and evidence, see Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008).   10
1998 real GDP fell by more than 2 percent, and with core inflation slightly negative by 
year’s end, even the rate of nominal GDP growth was negative for the year.   
On April 1, 1998, a new Bank of Japan Law came into effect, changing the de 
jure institutional balance of power between the central bank and the Ministry of Finance. 
The BOJ was given goal as well as instrument independence with respect to inflation; its 
official mandate under the new law was to maintain “price stability” – nowhere defined 
in the Law – and to share with the government in maintaining financial stability. Among 
the political factors underlying the grant of independence were the finance ministry’s 
failure effectively to address financial-sector weaknesses and the suspicion that an 
independent BOJ might have responded more aggressively to the late 1980s asset 
bubble.
8  
At the time the BOJ became independent, the overnight call interest rate stood at 
around 40 to 50 basis points and core inflation remained slightly positive. In February 
1999 after core inflation had become negative, the BOJ policy board, under Governor 
Masaru Hayami, lowered the policy interest rate effectively to zero. This action initiated 
the Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP). But in spite of the economy’s continuing weakness, 
the BOJ policy board, discerning signs of recovery and concerned about negative side-
effects from holding interest rates at zero for too long, ended the ZIRP in August 2000 by 
moving to a policy rate of around 25 basis points.
9  
                                                           
8 See Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000, pp. 91-3).  
9 In March 2000 Governor Hayami gave an influential speech on “Price Stability and Monetary Policy.” In 
it he rejected the idea of targeting a substantially positive inflation rate and questioned the contollability of 
inflation once it had reached a level as high as 2 to 3 percent per year. For discussion see Kuttner and Posen 
(2001, pp. 120-1).   11
  In retrospect, this move appears to have been ill timed. True, real GDP growth, 
which had been roughly zero in 1999, registered about 2.8 percent for all of 2000. The 
economy was hardly in robust condition, however, even though the yen’s foreign 
exchange value had stabilized after the appreciation of 1998-99. More remarkably, core 
inflation (excluding energy as well as food) had been zero or negative, with a growing 
deflationary trend, in every single month since September 1998! (See Figure 5.) The BOJ 
had earlier pledged to maintain the ZIRP “until deflationary concerns subside” (Ito and 
Mishkin 2006, p. 145). By instead lifting interest rates from zero despite ongoing and 
even accelerating deflation, the independent BOJ signaled that its discomfort with zero 
interest rates exceeded its fear of prolonging deflation. The economy deteriorated in the 
final quarter of 2000. Real GDP grew at rates of only 0.16 percent in 2001 and 0.26 
percent in 2002 (Figure 1), and in both years the rate of core consumer price deflation 
was close to 1 percent. 
  On March 19, 2001, the BOJ again lowered the nominal interest rate, effectively 
bringing back the ZIRP, and clarified that the ZIRP would be abandoned only after the 
rate of CPI inflation, excluding fresh food, was “stably” at a positive value. The zero 
interest rate was to be brought about, however, by excess-reserve targeting – a policy of 
unconventional, quantitative easing. Originally set at ¥5 trillion (an amount in excess of 
the then required reserves of ¥4 trillion), the target for bank current accounts with the 
BOJ was raised to ¥15-20 trillion by the final quarter of 2002 (Ito and Mishkin 2006, pp. 
146-7).  But deflation continued. There is considerable debate about the effectiveness of 
the quantitative easing policy. Its success was certainly hampered by the BOJ’s resistance 
to such measures prior to March 2001 and by the impression sometimes conveyed by   12
Bank officials, even after the policy’s adoption, that it was unlikely to succeed. 
Moreover, the BOJ had signaled a degree of inflation aversion so high as to be 
inconsistent with a successful quantitative easing strategy.
10 From this perspective, a 
change in regime at the BOJ probably was a necessary condition for progress in the battle 
against deflation.  
  Governor Toshihiko Fukui succeeded Governor Hayami in March 2003; in 
addition, two new deputy governors arrived, including Kasumasa Iwata, a supporter of 
inflation targeting. The new management increased the extent of quantitative easing 
sharply, at the same time clarifying that zero interest would not be abandoned in the 
future unless inflation was clearly positive. In October 2003, the BOJ announced that 
“necessary” (but not always sufficient) conditions for raising the interest rate from zero 
were that core CPI inflation be above zero “over a few months,” and that the Bank be 
convinced “that the prospective core CPI will not be expected to register below zero 
percent.”
11  
These measures may have been helpful in clarifying the intention of monetary 
policymakers to indeed keep the policy interest rate at its lower bound until deflation had 
been decisively vanquished; that is, the intention not to withdraw monetary stimulus 
when the inflation rate was still nonpositive. In addition, some observers place 
considerable weight on a Ministry of Finance program of massive dollar purchases over 
2003-04, which may have choked off another damaging yen appreciation cycle (see 
Hamada and Okada 2007, and the discussion below). Yet a third factor helping the 
                                                           
10 For a discussion of the issues, see Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005). It is certainly true that under 
quantitative easing, the increase in broad monetary aggregates was not nearly commensurate with the 
increase in the monetary base, nor did the additional liquidity lead still-troubled banks to extend much 
additional credit.    13
economy was the government effort led by economy and financial services minister 
Heizo Takenaka to curb regulatory forbearance and resolve the bad-loans problem of the 
banks. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi appointed Takenaka to head the financial 
services ministry in September 2002. Key subsequent events included the pre-emptive 
recapitalization and restructuring plan for Resona Bank in the spring of 2003, which 
arguably stabilized expectations of lending risk, as well as Takenaka’s insistence on a 
timetable for other banks to dispose of nonperforming loans. Over 2004-07, the rate of 
real GDP growth was much more stable and averaged around 2.25 percent per year. 
  Deflation, measured by a core CPI excluding energy as well as food, decelerated 
but did not disappear completely over these years.  In March 2006, however, the BOJ 
policy board took a major step toward clarifying its operational understanding of “price 
stability” – a clarification that, for the first time, specified at positive inflation as possibly 
consistent with the BOJ’s goals. The minutes of the March 8-9, 2006 meeting state that 
“It was agreed that, by making use of the rate of year-on-year change in the consumer 
price index to describe the understanding, an approximate range between zero and two 
percent was generally consistent with the distribution of each Board member’s 
understanding of medium- to long-term price stability.”
12  
  Notwithstanding the (at best) ambiguous evidence that deflation had receded, the 
BOJ, in July 2006 raised its lending rate to 0.25 percent.  This was the end of the ZIRP. 
The rate was raised further, to 50 basis points, in March 2007 before being cut again in 
2008 as the global financial crisis intensified, The BOJ cited improving economic activity 
levels and hinted that it would foster an “accommodative” environment by maintaining 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Ito and Mishkin (2006, p. 151). 
12 Bank of Japan (2006, p. 61).   14
rates at low positive levels for some time. Nonetheless, the move was controversial, with 
Prime Minister Koizumi, for one, arguing that the end of deflation was near but not yet 
fully achieved. As in previous episodes (see Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 2000, p. 173), 
one motivation for the BOJ’s action seems to have been a desire to underscore its 
independence. As one press account put it, “Yesterday's rate rise was the end of a 
prolonged bout of shadow boxing between government ministers, who believed a rate 
rise would dent the recovery, and the BoJ, which wanted to raise rates to demonstrate its 
independence and show it was able to take pre-emptive action.”
13  
  Even if Japan was truly at the end of its period of stagnation in 2006, its economy 
was overtaken by the events of 2007-09. With global financial markets in turmoil and 
Governor Fukui’s five-year term coming to a close early in 2008, the Japanese 
government and the upper house of the Diet found themselves deadlocked over the 
choice of a successor. The parliamentary opposition argued that the government’s initial 
nominees would compromise BOJ independence. In March, the two sides agreed to 
appoint as governor Maasaki Shirakawa of the BOJ, who had initially been nominated 
along with Takatoshi Ito, a vocal proponent of inflation targeting, to be one of two deputy 
governors. Ito was a casualty of the political wrangling. Japan’s financial sector, unlike 
those in the United States and Europe, was fortunately minimally exposed to subprime 
products. But as the word financial crisis intensified, the yen assumed the role of safe-
haven currency, appreciating multilaterally and bilaterally against the dollar. In 2008, 
                                                           
13 See “Bank of Japan acts to end its era of zero interest rates,” The Independent, July 15, 2006, at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/bank-of-japan-acts-to-end-its-era-of-zero-interest-rates-
408064.html 
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Japan suffered the dual blows of falling export demand and an asset-market driven 
appreciation. These both put renewed downward pressure on the price level. 
 
Real Interest Differentials, Natural Real Rates, and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
The open or uncovered interest rate parity theory of the exchange rate predicts that any 
nominal interest differental between currencies must be offset by expected depreciation 
of the high-interest currency against the low-interest currency. A corollary, derived by 
subtracting the expected inflation difference from both sides of the preceding 
relationship, is that expected real interest differentials are offset by expected movements 
in real exchange rates. These predictions have received quite limited support from the 
empirical record of the modern floating exchange rate era. I will nonetheless rely upon 
interest parity as a basic framework for thinking about the link between monetary policy 
and the yen. Why could this be a reasonable approach? There are three reasons: 
 
1.  Some framework is essential, and our knowledge of risk premia is rudimentary at 
best. It thus seems prudent to start with the simplest framework, even if it does 
not fit the data exactly, and then, if necessary, add additional conjectural factors 
such as risk premia. 
 
2.  If risk premia or other deviations from interest parity move slowly over time, a 
first-differenced relationship could be useful even if level deviations from interest 
parity are significant.   16
3.  My focus will be on long-horizon interest parity, and the evidence (partial as it is) 
suggests that interest parity may hold more closely for long-term interest rates 
(see, for example, Alexius and Sellin 2002; Chinn 2006). 
 
Modern discussions of monetary transmission – echoing the classic insights of 
Wicksell more than a century ago – stress the link between the real interest rate implied 
by the monetary policy stance and the natural, market-clearing real interest rate. The 
interest-parity relation suggests, moreover, that relative international discrepancies 
between natural and market real interest rates have consequences for real exchange rates. 
Thus, the interest-parity relationship, once reinterpreted, is a natural vehicle for linking 
the expansiveness or restrictiveness of monetary policy to the exchange rate. This 
approach is most likely to be informative when applied to long-term interest-parity,  
If rt  is the long-term real rate of interest at home, rt
* the long-term real rate abroad, 
and qt the real exchange rate (defined as the domestic consumption cost of foreign 
consumption), then if  t q  is the expected long-run real exchange rate as of date t, the 
(open) interest-parity condition is 
* . tt t t rr qq − =−            (1) 
Observe that in this notation, a rise in q is a real depreciation of the domestic currency.  A 
rise in 
*
tt rr − , holding  t q constant, elicits a real domestic appreciation.  The convention I 
am following – in which a rise in q is a real depreciation – is opposite to the one typically 
used for real exchange rate indexes such as those in Figure 2, which are meant to measure 
the real external values of currencies. Notice that for the sake of easier visual   17
interpretation in Figures 2, 6, and 7, I measured even the bilateral dollar-yen real 
exchange rate so that an increase is a real yen appreciation, contrary to the convention in 
equation (1). 
Let a tilde over a variable denote its “natural” level: the level consistent with market 
clearing in a flexible-price world. In particular, ~ qt denotes the flex-price equilibrium real 
exchange rate and,  t q   denotes the expected long-run “natural” real exchange rate, which 
– importantly – coincides with  t q . In the flex-price equilibrium the analog of eq. (1) 
holds: 
      
* . tt t t rr qq − =−              (2) 
By subtracting (2) from (1), we obtain a simple relationship that ties the current 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its flex-price level to the relative expansiveness 
of domestic monetary policy, as represented by deviations of market from natural long-
term real rates of interest: 
( ) ( ) qq rr rr tttt t t =+ − −− ~ ~ ~ .
**
         (3) 
If the domestic real rate of interest rises relative to its natural level, for example, then the 
domestic currency will appreciate in real terms relative to its own full-employment level 
(everything else equal). For example, a decline in economic growth prospects would 
naturally be associated with a fall in the natural long-term real interest rate, ~ r t , but if 
monetary policy is expected to remain restrictive over the medium term, the result could 
well be a real currency appreciation and recession.  
Of course, equation (1) by itself also has implications for the real exchange rate. 
Rewrite (1) as    18
( )
* . ttt t qq r r =−−                                                                                          
 
This relationship implies that if changes in the expected long-run real exchange rate  t q  
are small and if risk premia changes are excluded, the currency will appreciate in real 
terms when the domestic-foreign real interest differential rises. This pattern is most likely 
when the main shocks hitting the economy are monetary, for pure monetary shocks do 
not alter the long-run real exchange rate. In reality, the implied relation between current 
real exchange rates and real interest differentials seems to be rather loose for most 
currencies. In the Japanese case, however, I will argue that monetary shocks were 
important and do provide some traction for understanding exchange rate movements. 
This approach still leaves most of short-term exchange rate movements unexplained, of 
course, so it is important to keep in mind that expected real interest rates are measured 
with some error (due to the use of inflation-expectations proxies), that variable risk 
premia indeed are relevant, and that changes in expectations of long-run real exchange 
rates are likely to have occurred at various points. An advantage of formulation (3) is that 
it may be more robust than (1) to the presence of risk premia, but on the other hand, 
empirical implementation of (3) requires assumptions on the “natural” levels of real 
interest rates and exchange rates. 
  Figure 6 displays the monthly time series of Japan less United States real interest 
differentials and the real yen/dollar exchange rate index, calculated on the basis of CPIs 
(with an upward move in the exchange rate index being a real yen appreciation). The real 
interest rate is calculated as the 10-year government bond rate less the centered twelve-
month ex post inflation rate.    19
For the period from June 1980 to July 2008, the correlation coefficient between 
the real interest differential and the log real exchange rate is +0.45. Evidently real interest 
differentials do not explain everything, but they are surprisingly highly correlated with 
real yen/dollar movements, and in the direction that a simplified interest parity theory 
would suggest.
14 Figure 7 parallels Figure 6 with a comparison of Japanese and German 
real interest differentials. There are clearly periods of medium-term comovement 
between the Japan-Germany real exchange rate and the corresponding real interest 
differential, but in the case shown in Figure 7, the short-term correlation is far below that 
in Figure 6, and is in fact negative  (–0.11). In both figures there is a real depreciation in 
the 2000s beyond what real interest differentials would predict, perhaps reflecting 
revisions in expectations of the long-run real exchange rate. 
 
Patterns in Nominal and Yen Real Exchange Rates since 1988 
 
Figure 2 shows that, as far as the nominal exchange rate is concerned, the yen 
depreciated after late 1988 through April 1990, then embarking upon a sharp appreciation 
trajectory that would culminate in a nominal rate near 80 yen per dollar in April 1995. 
After depreciating again through late 1998, the yen reversed course and appreciated 
sharply through end-1999. Since then it has remained in a range of roughly 95 to 130 yen 
per dollar.  
                                                           
14 The bilateral real exchange rate measure and the Japanese CPI inflation measure used in calculating the 
real interest rate are adjusted to remove the effects of the consumption tax increases of April 1, 1989 and 
April 1, 1997. 
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More relevant for assessing the competitiveness of Japan’s exports is the yen’s 
real exchange rate, also shown in Figure 2 for the case of consumer-price deflators. The 
cycles are similar to those for the nominal exchange rate, but some distinct trends are 
now apparent. Most importantly, after the April 1995 peak for the yen, there is a strong 
trend of real depreciation, whether the real exchange rate is measured in real effective 
terms or bilaterally against the dollar. Between April 1995 and mid-2008, the yen 
depreciated in real effective terms (based on the CPI, as a log difference) by 57 percent. 
For the bilateral yen/dollar rate, the corresponding real depreciation rate is 60 percent.  
Strikingly, the real depreciation trend is driven entirely by the relatively higher 
inflation rates in Japan’s trading partners over a period when Japan at times suffered from 
outright deflation. The nominal exchange rate, in contrast, has remained within a 
relatively narrow range since around 2000. This unusual pattern – typically observed only 
in gold standard and other “hard peg” countries painfully unwinding an overvalued 
currency – is itself symptomatic of Japan’s post-bubble stagnation. 
Figure 2 suggests that the yen real exchange rate’s history since 1988 can be 
divided into (at least) six periods, characterized by the following given changes in the 
extreme month-average nominal exchange rates against the dollar: 
1. December  1988−April 1990: Depreciation (123 ¥/$ −158 ¥/$). 
2. April  1990−April 1995: Appreciation (158 ¥/$ − 84 ¥/$). 
3. April  1995−August 1998: Depreciation (84 ¥/$ −145 ¥/$). 
4. August  1998−December 1999: Appreciation (145 ¥/$ −103¥/$). 
5. December  1999−July 2007: Depreciation (103¥/$ −122 ¥/$). 
6. July  2007−December 2008: Appreciation (122 ¥/$ − 90¥/$).   21
Our question is how the cycles and trends in real exchange rates are driven by 
monetary policy actions as well as by the longer-run evolution of the Japanese economy. 
 Period  1. After the protracted appreciation period the followed the Plaza 
agreement, the yen appeared to stabilize early in 1988. Japanese authorities welcomed 
that development, which boosted the economy. The asset-price boom continued, 
however, and inflationary forces, which remained muted after a period of yen strength, 
were in fact gathering (Figure 5). Apparently unwilling to risk renewed appreciation, 
however, the Japanese authorities did not aggressively raise target interest rates (Figure 
3). Inflationary pressures were evident earlier in the United States economy, and the Fed 
did respond with a series of interest rate hikes starting in the second half of 1988 (Figure 
8).
15 The yen started to depreciate late in 1988. 
  The Bank of Japan began to raise short-term interest rates in mid-1989 (Figure 3). 
Core inflation was significantly higher by the spring of 1990 – by which time the price-
level effects of the April 1989 consumption tax increase are no longer distorting the data 
in Figure 5. Yen depreciation continued.  Even after the stock market peaked early in 
1990 and the yen hit bottom in April 1990, and with Japanese and U.S. long-term real 
interest rates close once again (Figure 6), the BOJ continued to tighten short rates. 
Around that time Japanese inflation also took a ratchet-step upward.  
  Why did the yen depreciate through April 1990 and not begin to appreciate sooner 
after Japanese monetary policy began to tighten? One possibility is that falling Japanese 
equity prices prompted an international portfolio shift out of yen. It may also be that the 
                                                           
15 The “Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee,” Meeting of May 17, 1988 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical1988.htm), noted that “consumer and 
producer prices have risen more rapidly recently. In addition, labor costs increased substantially in the first 
quarter.”   22
markets had some doubts about the willingness of the BOJ, not a formal inflation 
targeter, to do what was necessary to keep inflation down. As the policy interest rate 
continued to climb, however, markets became convinced that the BOJ meant to limit 
inflation. At this point, Japanese long-term real interest rates had generally been above 
U.S. rates for some time (Figure 6).
16 
 Period  2. With long-term Japanese real interest rates exceeding those of the U.S. 
in the spring of 1990, and Japanese short-term rates continuing to rise, the yen began to 
appreciate sharply. In the last quarter of 1990 the Japanese long-term nominal interest 
rate fell below the overnight rate, which stood at better than 8 percent throughout the first 
quarter of 1991. The sharp reversal in interest-rate policy that began in the spring of 1991 
moderated the pace of yen appreciation but did not induce depreciation. One reason was 
that the U.S. monetary tightening cycle had peaked in the fall of 1990, and U.S. policy 
rates were falling rapidly from the end of the year. The Fed’s view was that, despite the 
possible inflationary effects of a rise in oil prices, U.S. real activity was slowing.
17 By the 
final quarter of 1991, the Japanese economy was suffering the coincidence of a 
strengthening currency, uncomfortably high inflation, and asset-price collapse.
 In 1991, 
Japan’s real GDP growth slowed whereas the U.S. entered a mild recession. As U.S. 
growth recovered in 1992, however, Japan’s slowed further and it remained low in 1993. 
In 1994, Japanese growth turned sharply negative (Figure 9).  
Contributing to poor growth performance was a sharp upward movement of the 
yen (roughly 25 percent) between mid-1992 and the last quarter 1993. This was the start 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
16 Clarida and Waldman (2008) show that the response of exchange rates to inflation news has been quite 
different as between inflation-targeting central banks and non-targeters (such as the BOJ and the Fed).   23
of a second great episode of endaka fukyo. At this point U.S. inflation had largely 
stabilized but Japanese inflation was falling (Figure 5). Inflation expectations may 
therefore have played some role in the yen appreciation over 1992-93, but from a macro 
perspective the appreciation remains puzzling. It seems likely, however, that U.S.-Japan 
trade tensions created expectations that the Japanese authorities would limit potential yen 
depreciation. This is the interpretation favored by McKinnon and Ohno (1997). In 
January 1992, President George H. W. Bush visited Japan and secured commitments to 
specified increases in imports of autos and auto parts from the U.S.
18 The election of the 
Democratic Clinton administration in November 1992 may well have raised expectations 
of a more confrontational U.S. trade stance.  Coupled with Japan’s slow growth, U.S. 
recovery was leading to an expansion in American imports from Japan, and this, 
paradoxically, added to the tense atmosphere regarding trade. 
As Japan’s short-term interest rate fell and the Fed kept short-term rates on hold, 
the yen stabilized, but a renewed appreciation episode started in mid-1994, just as the yen 
overnight interest rate stopped falling and began to inch upward (Figure 3). Between June 
1994 and April 1995, when the yen reached its all-time peak, the yen appreciated by 12.5 
percent (log points) in real effective terms and by 18 percent (log points) in real terms 
against the dollar. This episode has puzzled observers, as it occurred when the Japanese 
economy was already quite weak and about to fall into deflation.  
As of early 1994, however, private and policy forecasts discerned signs of 
recovery, and indeed, at that point the long-term yen nominal interest rate began to move 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 See The “Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee,” Meeting of November 13, 
1990 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical1990.htm). The average price of crude 
petroleum doubled temporarily between the summer and fall of 1990 as Iraq invaded Kuwait in August.   24
up. Ahearne and others (2002, p. 17) quote the BOJ Quarterly Bulletins for May and 
November 1994 as pointing, respectively, to stabilization of the economic growth rate 
and to strength in “all categories of spending….” Short-term interest rates remained on 
hold, however, and with the fundamentals of the economy in reality deteriorating, it is 
possible, as Ahearne and others (2002, p. 18) suggest, that the market real interest rate 
rose above the natural rate, prompting the sharp yen appreciation of early 1995. This 
result is consistent with the prediction of equation (3). The sharp appreciation itself, 
coupled with the Kobe earthquake and falling equity prices, helped snuff out a possible of 
economic recovery. Early in 1995, headline CPI inflation, which had risen slightly 
toward the end of 1994, dropped to around zero. Core inflation also was low and 
declining (Figure 5). 
Period 3. In April 1995, a series of dramatic policy interventions, carried out by 
both Japanese and foreign authorities, initiated a new, long-term weakening trend for the 
yen. The BOJ discount rate was slashed and the yen overnight interest rate fell 
dramatically, reaching a level of about 0.5 percent by the fall of 1995 (Figure 3). As 
described by McKinnon and Ohno (1997, pp. 226-8), the U.S. eased mercantile pressures 
and Japan, while several countries carried out joint foreign exchange market interventions 
to support the dollar in currency markets. The Japanese authorities had purchased dollars 
in unilateral official intervention operations on 21 days in March 1995 as the yen 
continued to rise. They intervened on eight more days between April 3 and 18, 
purchasing about $500 billion for the month.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 This visit may best be remembered as the one in which President Bush, at a state dinner, vomited into 
Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa’s lap.   25
Nominal long-term interest rates in Japan fell dramatically as expectations of low 
growth and low inflation took hold. As Figure 6 shows, Japan’s long-term real interest 
rate fell far below that of the United States. From a level of around 4.2 percent per year in 
March 1995, the nominal10-year JGB rate fell to a low of around 0.9 percent in the fall of 
1998. The upward spike in domestic financial instability late in 1997, after the outbreak 
of the crisis in Asian emerging markets, no doubt contributed to the yen’s rather rapid 
depreciation through August 1998. 
Not only did Japanese nominal long-term rates start to rise in the fall of 1998, but 
also, accelerating Japanese CPI deflation had started to cause the long-term real Japanese 
interest rate to start trending upward. Even before then, U.S. short and real long-term 
rates had started to decline in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Eventually those 
factors halted the yen’s depreciation and reinforced a new appreciation cycle. 
Period 4. It was in August 1998 that the yen’s next real appreciation cycle began. 
During this period, Japan’s real long-term interest rate rose relative to that in the United 
States. In Japan the overnight interest rate stood at just under 0.5 percent and would fall 
effectively to zero within a year, but in the presence of deflation expectations, yen 
appreciation continued.  At the point when the zero lower bound was reached late in 
February 1999, the BOJ had no further ability to lower the short-term nominal interest 
rate. By the end of 1999, Japanese and U.S. real long-term interest rates were again very 
close, and the upward trend in the (negative) Japan-U.S. differential had ceased (Figure 
6), in part because U.S. headline inflation had moved upward.    26
Over the entire period from August 1998 to December 1999, the yen appreciated 
in real effective terms by 29.8 percent and in real bilateral terms against the dollar by 
31.2 percent. 
Period 5. In the subsequent long real depreciation phase, a falling yen price level 
reinforced the yen’s nominal depreciation against the dollar. The yen fell sharply in real 
terms through the end of 2001 as Japan’s relative real interest rate fell. From August 2000 
to March 2001 the BOJ held policy interest rates above zero, as described earlier, having 
perceived signs of recovery despite a core inflation rate that remained negative.
19 This 
move caused a small temporary strengthening of the yen, but economic activity slowed 
and deflation accelerated. 
The yen stabilized and even rose (against the dollar) after early 2002 as Japan’s 
real interest rate rose toward the U.S. level (Figure 6), but depreciation returned early in 
2005 despite a relative Japanese real interest rate that continued to rise for several months 
(part of the Greenspan “conundrum” period).  
Hamada and Okada (2007) argue that the yen would have appreciated far more in 
2003-04, crippling Japanese recovery, if not for the energetic dollar purchases carried out 
by Japan’s Ministry of Finance under Vice Minister Zembei Mizoguchi. Between January 
2003 and the end of March 2004, the MOF sold ¥35,256.4 billion for dollars in the 
foreign exchange market.
20 Ito (2004) discusses the rationale and context for these 
interventions in detail and suggests that while they could have had a weakening effect on 
the yen of up to 13 percent compared to the counterfactual of no intervention, it is also 
possible that their effects were mostly temporary. In any case, the Fed had begun to 
                                                           
19 Ito and Mishkin (2006, pp. 145-6).   27
tighten U.S. monetary conditions in mid-2004 in the face of mounting inflation pressure 
(Figures 5 and 8). From April 2005 Japanese long-term real rates began to fall compared 
to the U.S., and yen depreciation accelerated. 
  In July 2006, the BOJ definitively ended its zero-interest policy regime, as we 
have seen (Figure 3). Even with some signs of Japanese recovery and Japan’s relative 
real long-term interest rate rising, yen depreciation continued through July 2007. It could 
be that markets perceived unusually high risks in a period of monetary policy transition, 
or that market expectations of Japanese long-term growth were again being revised 
downward.  
 Period  6. Yen behavior during this period is dominated by Japan’s emergence as a 
relative safe haven in a period of global financial market crisis. Paradoxically, the 
weakness of Japan’s financial system over prior years may have deterred Japanese 
institutions from overextending themselves during the 2000s, unlike institutions in 
Europe and especially the United States. The yen strengthened sharply starting in the fall 
of 2008. At that time, emerging markets and industrial countries came under financial 
pressure and the world price of oil plummeted from the unprecedented heights reached 
the previous summer. By the end of 2008 the yen was around the ¥90 per dollar level. Of 
course, the yen was much weaker in real terms by 2008 than when the yen had reached 
that nominal rate in the mid-1990s. Even so, a higher yen, coupled with rapidly shrinking 
markets for Japanese exports, threw Japan’s growth sharply into reverse.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 See Ministry of Finance Japan, “Foreign Exchange Intervention Operations,” 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm.   28
Long Run Trends in the Yen: The Role of Productivity Growth 
 
Movements in relative real long-term interest rates offer some insight into short-term 
exchange rate dynamics, but it is also likely that perceptions of long-run real exchange 
rates changed over the period following the collapse of Japan’s asset bubble. We would 
like to understand whether and when such changes in long-term perceptions may have 
occurred. A closely related challenge is to explain the observed long-term trends in the 
yen’s real exchange rate. I therefore turn to the question of long-term movements in the 
yen and their relationship to underlying economic fundamentals. This section focuses on 
productivity trends, the next, on trends in international trade. 
 
The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson Approach 
Perhaps the most fundamental benchmark model for thinking about real exchange rates is 
the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) model (see Rogoff 1992; Obstfeld 1993; Asea and 
Mendoza 1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, Chapter 4). The model posits economies with 
two sectors, tradable and nontradable goods. In essence, the real exchange rate depends 
on the international “difference in differences” between the economies’ tradable-sector 
and nontradable-sector productivity growth rates.  The HBS model provides a key 
benchmark, because real appreciations consistent with the model’s predictions are purely 
productivity driven and do not entail a decline in the competitiveness of exports.  
  To understand the HBS approach, let P be Japan’s consumer price level and P* 
that of the United States, with E the price of yen in terms of dollars. Then the real 
exchange rate of the yen against the dollar (defined so that an increase is a relative real   29
depreciation of the yen) is q = EP*/P. In this notation, a rise in E (nominal yen 
depreciation) or rise in P*/P (fall in Japan’s relative money price level) lowers the price 
of consumer goods in Japan compared to the U.S.  
  Each country’s consumer price level, in turn, depends on the domestic price 
indexes for tradable and nontradable goods, denoted  T P  and  N P  for Japan and 
*
T P and 
*
N P  
for the United States. In general, as shown by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007, p. 356), a 
useful approximation for the change in the log yen real exchange rate is  
** * /
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                  (4) 
where γ is the share of tradables in the CPI (the same in the two countries). This equation 
discloses the two main determinants of the real exchange rate: the international ratio of 
relative nontradables prices, and the relative international price of tradables. 
  The HBS theory presumes that the law of one price holds for every tradable good 
and that consumers in the two countries have identical preferences over the tradable 
goods. Thus, 
*
TT EPP = , so that the HBS theory operates entirely through the 
determination of the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables. There is 
considerable evidence, however, that relative international tradables prices vary greatly, 
at least for some country pairs and over some horizons. Moreover, they tend to covary 
positively and strongly with nominal exchange rates, so that nominal yen depreciation, 
for example, raises the price level of tradables in Japan relative to tradable price levels 
abroad. For Japan, the terms of trade closely mirror the evolution of the exchange rate, 
with nominal (and real) yen depreciation generally associated with deterioration in 
Japan’s terms of trade – a rise in import price relative to export prices. I temporarily put   30
this evidence aside to focus on the HBS predictions about relative nontraded-goods 
prices, predictions that are quite robust as longer-term predictions and are broadly 
consistent with data from many countries. 
  Over a sufficiently long horizon – one in which goods prices are flexible and 
domestic factor markets can adjust to ensure the equality of factor rewards across sectors 
of the economy  – relative productivity growth is a prime determinant of the first term on 
the right-hand side of equation (4). To see this, assume that outputs in the tradable and 
nontradable sectors are given by the constant-returns production functions of capital and 
labor: 
 
where  T A  and  N A  measure total factor productivity (TFP).
21 Let  LT µ  denote labor’s 
income share in tradables,  LN µ  its share in nontradables, and  ˆ x the proportional rate of 
change of variable x. Furthermore, define the relative price of nontradables as / . NT p PP ≡  
Proceed as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Section 4.2.1) but allow for the possibility that 
both the real (tradable) wage w and the real (tradable) return to capital r can change. Log 
differentiation of zero-profit conditions, assuming firm optimization and free domestic 
factor mobility, yields: 
                                                           
21 It would be simple to include nontraded goods as an input to tradables (think of retailing services 
required to deliver tradables to final consumers). That change would not alter the main qualitative 
predictions concerning relative sectoral TFP and the relative price of nontradables, but it would place a 
wedge between different countries’ price indexes for tradable consumption. That additional wedge would, 
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Combining these, one obtains a relationship linking the change in the real exchange rate 
to relative TFP growth, 
         ( ) ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ () . TN L NL T p AA w r µµ =−+ − −                            (6) 
In general, the change in p depends not only on the sectoral difference in TFP growth, but 
also on the evolution of the wage-rental ratio, with a rise in the latter raising p when 
nontradables are relatively labor intensive.
22 If there are significant movements in relative 
factor rewards over time and intersectoral differences in functional income shares, then 
the relation between the relative price of tradables and sectoral TFP growth rates may not 
be straightforward. Evolution in the relative price of nontradables will depend exclusively 
on differential TFP growth only in very special cases, for example, when sectoral factor 
shares are the same.  
  One way to circumvent the problem is to focus on labor productivity rather than 
total factor productivity, as Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1999) do. That approach 
potentially confounds long-term TFP movements with other factors, but it has a number 
of countervailing advantages, as Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba show.  
  To understand their approach, note that along the economy’s long-run production 
possibilities frontier, p equals the ratio of labor’s marginal physical productivity in 
                                                           
22 One could solve for the endogenous wage-rental ratio in terms of exogenous variables by imposing 
further structure on the consumption side and assuming a balanced growth path, as Asea and Mendoza 
(1994) do, but at the cost of restricting generality. For my purposes it is not necessary to follow that route. 
In the context of a growth model, and assuming a balanced growth path with a constant marginal product of   32
tradables to its marginal physical productivity in nontradables. Let  ( )( ) /, 1 TT T fk FK L ≡  
and  () ( ) /, 1 NN N gk GK L ≡ . Under the tentative assumption that marginal labor products 
are proportional to average labor products, one can therefore write 
 
for suitable constants φ and ψ. Log differentiating this expression, one finds that 
 
Here,  () ˆ ˆ 1 TL T T Ak µ +− is the growth rate of (average) labor productivity in tradables (in 
contrast to TFP in tradables), whereas  ( ) ˆ ˆ 1 NL N N Ak µ +−  is the growth rate of labor 
productivity in nontradables. (In general, labor productivity growth rates exceed TFP 
growth rates when there is capital deepening over time.)  
  The earlier tentative assumption that marginal and average labor products 
coincide can hold true only if the last equation is the same as equation (6). Let  T σ and  N σ  
be the elasticities of factor substitution in the traded and nontraded goods sectors. Then 
one can express the last equation in terms of factor-price changes as 
                                                                                                                                                                             












the formula in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 4) for the case of a constant world real interest rate. 
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This equation is valid – that is, it agrees with equation (6) – when (and only when) 
1. TN σ σ == Thus, for Cobb-Douglas production functions, the long-run relative price of 
nontradables depends exclusively on differential labor-productivity growth in 
nontradables and tradables. I will assume that Cobb-Douglas production functions 
adequately represent Japanese industry. 
  Below I explore the relationship between the preceding labor productivity 
differential and the yen’s real exchange rate. One point to notice, however, is that for the 
tradable and nontradable sectors, short-term movements in labor productivity and TFP 
are very highly positively correlated. The six panels of Figure 10 (a through f) illustrate 
this correlation for the tradable and nontradable sectors of Japan, the United States, and 
Germany. Productivity growth rate data are from the EU KLEMS database (URL: 
http://www.euklems.net/, March 2008), and sectoral value-added productivity figures are 
constructed from less aggregated industry figures using a Törnqvist index with value-
added weights.
23 As an example, for Japanese tradables the contemporaneous correlation 
coefficient between labor productivity and TFP growth rates is 0.95; for Japanese 
nontradables the corresponding correlation coefficient is 0.94. Note that, as the HBS 
literature suggests, productivity growth in tradables is generally higher than that in 
                                                           
23 Tradables consist of agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; mining and quarrying; total 
manufacturing; and electricity, gas, and water supply. Nontradables consist of construction; wholesale and 
retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage, and communication; finance, insurance, real estate, 
and business services; public administration and defense; compulsory social security; education, health, and 
social work; and other community, social, and personal services.  
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Evidence on HBS and Its Component Sub-theories 
For much of its postwar history Japan was a poster-child for the HBS theory. In an early 
study, Hsieh (1982) derived a one-factor version of the HBS theory and tested it on labor 
productivity data for Japan and Germany versus aggregates of major trading partners. For 
his study, tradables were defined as manufacturing and nontradables as 
nonmanufacturing. The theory received support for both countries, but over a sample 
period (1954-1976) containing very few observations from the post-1973 floating 
exchange rate era. As I argue below, however, deviations from the HBS model are likely 
to be larger and more persistent under floating exchange rates.
25  
  Marston (1987) offered the first detailed study of Japan based on a substantial 
span of data from the floating exchange rate period (1973-1983).  Marston found that in 
the U.S. over that period, tradables productivity growth exceeded that in nontradables by 
13.2 percent. For Japan, he found that the same cumulative differential was 73.2 percent.  
Japanese relative nontradables prices rose by 56.9 percent as opposed to only 12.3 
percent in the U.S, The yen appreciated significantly against the U.S. dollar in real terms. 
These results seemed strikingly to confirm the HBS approach.
26 
                                                           
24 Lee and Tang (2007) find that logarithmic levels of TFP and labor productivity need not be highly or 
(even positively) correlated for the U.S. and Germany, although they are for Japan. In panel regressions on 
an industrial-country sample, they find that labor productivity variables and TFP variables have opposite 
effects on real exchange rates. 
25 Hsieh’s findings in support of HBS went against previous negative cross-section work reported by 
Officer (1976). 
26 In a related vein, Yoshikawa (1990) claimed an important role for relative labor productivities in 
determining the long-run nominal yen/dollar exchange rate over 1973-87. Yoshikawa’s model assumed an 
average law-of-one-price relationship for tradables, and allowed for changes in the relative price of energy   35
  Subsequent research has focused on larger samples of countries. De Gregorio, 
Giovannini, and Wolf (1994), using the newly assembled OECD sectoral database for 
1970-85, showed a strong relationship between differential sectoral TFP growth and the 
growth of relative nontradables prices for a sample of 14 countries including Japan. They 
did not look explicitly at real exchange rates. Asea and Mendoza (1994) reached similar 
conclusions regarding relative sectoral prices levels within the OECD sample, but found 
that TFP differentials were much less useful in understanding even low-frequency 
movements in real exchange rates. 
  That failure is not surprising in view of equation (4), as a major role in 
movements of the real exchange rate, alongside that of relative sectoral prices, is played 
by the relative international price of tradables. Under floating exchange rates, the latter 
relative price is highly correlated with the nominal exchange rate in the short run, and 
hence is much more volatile than either of the relative prices p and p* that enter the first 
right-hand term in (4). The volatility in relative international tradables prices, to some 
degree, reflects widespread violations of the law of one price; it also reflects terms of 
trade changes (given international differences in consumer preferences) as well as the 
nontradable content of final “tradable” consumption goods. Engel (1999) argues that even 
over longer horizons, variation in the relative international prices of tradables dominates 
real exchange rate movements of the United States dollar; this point has implications for 
the yen that I will explore later. Were Hsieh’s (1982) tests to be carried out over post-
                                                                                                                                                                             
inputs. Rather than focusing on relative productivity in nontraded and traded sectors, however, 
Yoshikawa’s model focuses on the relative importance of labor and energy in producing export goods. I 
return to the importance of energy prices below.    36
1973 data, it seems certain that any measured effects of intersectoral productivity 
differentials would be swamped by the influence of nominal exchange rate movements.
27  
Many recent studies employ error-correction models to look for cointegrating 
relationships among real exchange rates and the other variables that underlie the HBS 
model. The basic presumption of these models is that real exchange rates contain unit 
roots. While the unit-root hypothesis has proved difficult to reject in the spans of data that 
are typically used, the question of mean reversion in real exchange rates in fact remains 
quite open, with many researchers believing in some degree of slow mean reversion, a 
belief derived in part from the analysis of longer time series samples. Thus, Taylor and 
Taylor (2004, p. 154) describe as a “consensus view” the propositions “that short-run 
PPP does not hold, that long-run PPP may hold in the sense that there is significant mean 
reversion of the real exchange rate, although there may be factors impinging on the 
equilibrium exchange rate through time ….” It should be kept in mind that the statistical 
tests described next all rely on the hypothesis that real exchange rates and their 
determinants are I(1) random variables, 
  Retaining a focus on the OECD sectoral data but working in terms of labor 
productivity as noted above, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1999) looked separately at the 
two components of the HBS model: the ability of sectoral productivity differences to 
explain the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables, and the validity of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) with respect to indexes of tradables prices. Using 1970-
1993 data, carry out a panel cointegration analysis aimed at ascertaining long-run 
dynamic features of the data record. They found that relative sectoral prices and relative 
                                                           
27 Park and Ogaki (2007) caution, however, against drawing long-run implications from data samples of the 
size that Engel uses.    37
productivities were cointegrated with a coefficient near 1.0.
28 However, nominal 
exchange rates against the U.S. dollar were not cointegrated with tradables prices relative 
to those of the U.S. Interestingly, the hypothesis of PPP for tradables fared much better 
when Germany rather than the United States was used as the comparison country. Kakkar 
and Ogaki (1999), also using cointegration techniques, explicitly studied long-run 
comovements in real exchange rates and relative nontradables prices. Their long data 
sample, ranging from as early as 1929 to the late 1980s, contained several spans with 
fixed exchange rates. Particularly in floating-rate data, they found mixed support for a 
close long-run relationship between relative nontradables prices and real exchange 
rates.
29 This is consistent, once again, with a large role for nominal exchange rate 
movements in driving deviations from PPP for tradable goods. In a panel cointegration 
study covering 48 countries, Ricci, Milesi-Ferretti, and Lee (2008), relate real exchange 
rates to a range of explanatory variables. They find a statistically significant productivity 
effect consistent with the HBS theory, but regard it as relatively small in magnitude.
30 
  A number of studies focus explicitly on real exchange rates of East Asian 
countries. Some authors, such as Chinn (2000, p. 20), argue that “The East Asian 
economies are exactly the type for which Balassa posited the relevance of the HBS effect: 
economies characterized by rapid growth, presumably due to rapid manufacturing—and 
hence traded—sector productivity growth.” Ito, Isard, and Symansky (1999), Drine and 
Rault (2003), and Thomas and King (2004), however, all find mixed evidence concerning 
the HBS theory. Chinn (2000) himself studies the bilateral real exchange rates of a group 
                                                           
28 Kakkar (2003) established the same result for a model based on TFP measures. 
29 Similarly mixed evidence is found by DeLoach (1997), who uses CPI/WPI ratios to proxy relative 
nontradables prices. 
30 Further analysis and discussion can be found in Lee et al. (2008).    38
of nine East Asian countries, including Japan and China, against the U.S. dollar. He finds 
that for Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the real exchange rate is cointegrated with 
relative sectoral labor productivities based on a 1970-93 sample. He notes, however, that 
real exchange rates display protracted swings away from the levels predicted either by 
relative nontradables prices or by relative productivity levels. Kakkar and Yan (2006) 
assemble a disaggregated data set of TFPs for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea. Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand, They find that in panel data, real exchange rates appear 
cointegrated with relative sectoral productivity differentials, but whereas long-run PPP 
for tradables appears reasonable when East Asian currencies are compared to the yen, it 
fails when the dollar is the comparison currency. This difference could result from the 
closer trading linkages among the East Asian countries, including Japan.
31 Choudhri and 
Khan (2005) present a panel study of 16 emerging market countries, including some in 
East Asia, over 1976-94. They find that bilateral real exchange rates against the dollar are 
related to relative nontraded goods prices and that the latter are, in turn, related to relative 
labor productivity as the HBS theory suggests, but they do not test directly for a link 
between real exchange rates and relative sectoral productivity differences. They also find 
a role for the terms of trade in determining real exchange rates. Chen and Rogoff (2003) 
document a positive and significant HBS effects in the bilateral real exchange rates of 
Australia and New Zealand against the United States.  
                                                           













, rather than equation (6). The authors then work with the level form of 
this equation under the hypothesis that the real return to capital, r, is an I(0) random variable. Their 
methodology obviously obliges them to supply labor-income shares in tradables and nontradables.    39
  The body of evidence on the HBS theory indicates a definite connection between 
international differences in relative sectoral productivity levels and international 
differences in the price of nontraded in terms of traded goods. The connection seems 
valid whether productivity is measured by output-labor ratios or by TFP. Direct linkages 
between productivity variables or relative price variables and real exchange rates is more 
tenuous, especially under floating nominal exchange rates, because of large and persistent 
deviations from purchasing power parity for tradables; see equation (4). These deviations 
may limit the usefulness of the HBS theory for explaining or predicting real exchange 
rates over all but the longest horizons. PPP for tradables – and therefore the HBS 
connection between relative productivity levels and real exchange rates – may hold more 
closely for pairs of countries with relatively extensive mutual trading links. 
 
Sectoral Productivity and the Yen’s Real Exchange Rate 
A real yen appreciation caused by high productivity growth in tradables would not 
undermine the competitive position of Japanese exporters.  The available evidence 
indicates, however, that at least in the short run, episodes of sharp yen appreciation have 
indeed harmed the fortunes of Japan’s manufacturing exporters, with negative 
implications for overall Japanese economic growth (as suggested by Figure 1). Dekle and 
Fukao (2008) document how the yen’s 1985-95 appreciation raised average costs levels 
in Japanese industries relative to those in the United States. 
  A first regularity to examine is the short-run relationship between real exchange 
rate movements and changes in the HBS relative productivity variable, which I define in 
terms of relative labor productivity as  ( ) ( )
** ** ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ. TT NN TT NN YLYL YLYL   −− − − −− −    In   40
practice, I take Japan as the home country and take the “starred” foreign country to be 
either the U.S. or Germany. Figures 11a and 11b, respectively, plot the data, which show 
no evidence of short-run positive correlation. Indeed the sample correlation coefficients 
are slightly negative, equal to −0.14 for the comparison with the U.S. and to −0.16 for the 
comparison with Germany. These short-term comovements are the opposite of what the 
HBS theory predicts as a longer-term correlation. 
  In the short term, when prices are sticky and factors are immobile between 
sectors, real yen appreciation reduces the demand for Japanese exports and puts 
downward pressure on exporters’ profit margins. This account is consistent with the 
evidence in Dekle and Fukao (2008). The appreciation could result from monetary factors 
as discussed earlier, from changed perceptions of the long-run equilibrium real exchange 
rate, or from shifting risk premia. Faced with reduced demand, Japanese exporters react 
immediately by reducing levels of capacity utilization and working existing labor pool 
less intensely. These adjustments, in turn, lower measured productivity, whether 
measured as TFP or as labor productivity. 
  For the United States, Basu (1996) has made a compelling case that procyclical 
rates of factor utilization play the main role in explaining the observed high degree of 
procyclical overall productivity.
32 His analysis uses data on material inputs effectively to 
track firms’ use of capital and labor inputs. It would be interesting to use methods like 
Basu’s to more closely isolate the exogenous technological shocks driving observed 
                                                           
32 See also Basu and Fernald (2001). For a related analysis using Japanese data, see Vecchi (2000).  
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productivity movements in traded and nontraded sectors. The resulting data would deliver 
a sharper test of the HBS theory. 
In Figures 11a and 11b, real exchange rate movements are more volatile than the 
contemporaneous movements in international relative productivity ratios. The latter are, 
however, still surprisingly large. A yen appreciation lowers demand for tradable goods 
and may raise the demand for nontradables. To the extent that slow growth in the export 
sector depresses overall demand, however, any resulting rise in the cyclical component of 
nontraded-sector productivity may be dampened. In fact, over 1978-2005, the correlation 
between changes in Japanese tradable and nontradable productivity is only 0.05, 
effectively zero. 
  An analysis of longer-term changes in productivity levels and real exchange rates 
gives a sense of whether the historical trends are consistent with the HBS theory.  For this 
purpose, I use the log levels version of equation (4), taking γ = 0.25 and identifying the 
relative prices p and p* with the tradables-to-nontradables labor productivity ratios. 
Figures 12a and 12b present the data for the comparison of Japan against the U.S. and 
Germany, respectively, over the nearly three decades from 1978-2005. Against the U.S., 
over this entire period, Japan experiences a small real depreciation and a small decline in 
the HBS relative intersectoral productivity variable. In the interim, however, the swings 
away from “Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson” parity are huge and persistent. On this metric, 
the yen was about 50 percent “undervalued” during the strong dollar of the Reagan years, 
and about 40 percent “overvalued” during the height of the mid-1990s appreciation, 
which pushed Japan into protracted deflation. The “overvaluation” of the first endaka 
fukyo of the late 1980s is comparatively small and briefer, as is the “overvaluation” that   42
emerges after the Asian crisis (August 1998−December 1999, described as Period 4 
above). In all of these episodes, often identified as misalignments, sharp movements in 
the yen’s nominal exchange rate were associated with commensurately sharp movements 
in relative international tradables prices. As in equation (4), those developments helped to 
drive the real exchange rate far from the HBS benchmark. I return to this point in the next 
section, which explicitly introduces international trade in different products. 
  Figure 12a shows that in many of the subperiods of the 1978-2007 span, the yen’s 
evolution vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar is in fact the opposite of what the HBS theory would 
imply. I have already observed (in connection with Figures 11a and 11b) that year-to-year 
changes in bilateral real exchange rates and the bilateral HBS productivity variable are 
slightly negatively correlated. The correlation between log levels in Figure 12a is a much 
more dramatic –0.46. Furthermore, the relevant productivity trends seem quite minor in 
magnitude compared to the long swings in the exchange rate – for example, over the 
1995-2004 subperiod, when the HBS theory does get at least the direction of change in 
the real exchange rate right. But the magnitude is way off. Changes in real exchange rates 
are more volatile than changes in productivity, yet are quite persistent.
33 Lane (2008) 
finds that the yen’s multilateral real exchange rate is positively and significantly related 
to a multilateral HBS variable, but all in all, there is little evidence that this relationship is 
important for the bilateral yen rate against the dollar. 
                                                           
33 Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) observe that from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, there was 
positive TFP growth in Japanese manufacturing while TFP stagnated in nontraded sectors such as 
construction.  They attribute this in part to the concentration of “zombie” firms in nontraded sectors. Taken 
alone, this pattern would cause a real yen appreciation according to the HBS theory. However, U.S. 
productivity developments also played a role. Furthermore, Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap argue that 
sectors heavily populated with zombie firms could be characterized by excessive supply and hence lower 
prices.   43
  The bilateral real exchange rate of the yen against Germany puts the HBS theory 
in a slightly better light; see Figure 12b.  The real exchange rate still fluctuates about the 
HBS trend, but the departures are smaller and less persistent than in the yen/dollar case. 
Notable examples of “misalignment” – in the narrow sense of a significant departure 
from the HBS trend – are the yen’s real depreciation against the deutsche mark at the 
time of the second oil shock of the late 1970s, real appreciation in the mid-1990s (less 
pronounced than that against the United States), and a substantial real appreciation 
around the launch date of the euro in 1999. Notwithstanding the negative correlation in 
annual changes shown in Figure 11b, the correlation between log levels is strongly 
positive and equal to 0.61, which is suggestive a reasonably strong HBS effect over the 
medium term. 
  An interesting question is why HBS has a bit more success in explaining swings 
of the Japanese currency against Germany than against the United States. Canzoneri, 
Cumby, and Diba (1999) likewise found that convergence to PPP for tradables held more 
closely when they compared OECD countries to Germany, rather than the U.S. As the 
world’s premier exporter, Germany’s integration into global markets exceeds that of the 
larger and more insular United States economy. This may explain the greater apparent 
coherence between world and German tradables prices, which, in turn, might reduce the 
size and persistence of departures from an HBS benchmark. An interesting general 
question is whether predictions of the HBS theory holds more closely for economies that 
are more open to international trade. 
  The figures leave open the possibility that the real exchange rate might appear to 
be cointegrated with the HBS relative productivity variable, Lane (2008), who examines   44
the real effective CPI exchange rate in a multivariate context using an effective HBS 
variable as a regressor, finds this to be the case. However, Figures 12a and 12b suggest 
that HBS factors could have little explanatory power for real exchange rates over 
medium-term horizons, and that forecasters would face considerable uncertainty in 
predicting when a real exchange rate might converge near to the HBS benchmark.
34 
 
Overall Productivity and the Yen’s Real Exchange Rate 
  Another regularity worth noting is the relationship between overall productivity 
growth measures and the real exchange rate, shown in Figure 13. As argued by Hayashi 
and Prescott (2002), Japan’s stagnation has been characterized by a reversal in the earlier 
increasing trend of TFP relative to the United States. In addition, overall labor 
productivity leveled off  in the mid-1990s (again relative to the U.S.).  
The arc of relative productivity is roughly captured by the real exchange rate – in 
a manner more consistent with the Kravis-Lipsey effect (price levels are relatively low in 
relatively poor countries) than with the HBS effect.
35 One channel through which overall 
productivity growth could affect the real exchange rate is through the terms of trade. The 
strict HBS theory’s apparent assumption that terms of trade movements are unimportant 
for the real exchange rate, except insofar as they affect productivity growth, is quite 
wrong for Japan, as I document next. No discussion of the real exchange rate is complete 
unless one integrates the implications of international trade in heterogeneous goods. 
 
                                                           
34 Two important future research issues are to take into account both the endogeneity of the traded versus 
nontraded categories, as well as the importance of nontraded distribution services in determing the 
consumer price of tradable goods. See also Lee and Tang (2007). Devereux (1999) presents a model in 
which endogenous growth of the distribution sector affects the path of the real exchange rate.   45
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  The simplest versions of the HBS theory ignore variation in the relative prices of 
different tradable goods. There is considerable cross-country evidence, however, that 
such variation is an important (if not dominant) source of real exchange rate variation. In 
turn, that evidence makes it plausible that factors related to international trade can help 
explain the real exchange rate deviations in Figures 12a and 12b. 
 
The Yen’s Real Exchange Rate and the Terms of Trade 
A very basic fact about the yen’s real exchange rate is that its level has an 
extremely high positive correlation with Japan’s terms of trade – the ratio of export price 
to import prices.  
Figure 14 graphs both the terms of trade and the yen’s real effective exchange rate 
based on unit labor costs in Japan and its main trade partners (these are monthly data in 
logs). In the figure, the terms of trade measure is constructed as an aggregate export price 
index divided by an aggregate import price index (both from IMF, International 
Financial Statistics), so that a rise in the terms of trade causes a welfare-enhancing shift 
in Japan’s national budget constraint. Evidently, the terms of trade closely mirror both the 
trends and cycles in the real exchange rate; the correlation between the two series’ log 
levels is 0.75. This measure of the overall terms of trade – despite including volatile 
components such as oil prices – generally shows somewhat less volatility than the real 
exchange rate. Were the export and import indexes restricted to manufactured products, 
the resulting terms of trade measure would be much less variable, as is shown below. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35 I am grateful to Mick Devereux for discussions on this point.    46
  An important empirical mechanism behind the high correlation displayed in 
Figure 14 is that the terms of trade and the real exchange rate both respond, and in the 
same direction, to shocks to the nominal exchange rate. With pervasive labor-cost 
stickiness, no segmentation between domestic and export markets, and producer-currency 
pricing of exports, both the real exchange rate based on unit labor costs the terms of trade 
would both move in proportion to a nominal exchange rate change, whatever its cause.  
  Let us provisionally maintain the assumptions that there is no international market 
segmentation and no pricing to market in order to gauge their usefulness in explaining 
how the terms of trade and the real exchange rate are related in the data. For this purpose, 
I focus on bilateral comparisons between Japan and the U.S. or Germany, assuming for 
simplicity a Cobb-Douglas form for various price indexes. 
  Retaining the earlier notation, I assume that overall CPI P for Japan is given 
by
1 . TN PP P
γ γ − =  If X P is the price index of Japanese exports and M P the Japanese export 
index, then the price index for tradables is
1 . TX M PP P
α α − =  Once again, the provisional 
assumption behind this definition – one that I will modify later – is that exporters do not 
price to market, so that the price of exported goods is the same as that of exportables sold 
domestically. The terms of trade are / . XM PP Parallel price indexes characterize foreign 
countries.  
  The real exchange rate (expressed as the price of the foreign CPI in terms of 
Japan’s) is:    47
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This equation shows that the bilateral real exchange rate between Japan and a foreign 
competitor is the product of three factors. First is the relative price of Japanese exports in 
head-to-head competition with the other exporter, 
* /. XX EP P  A rise in domestic export 
prices relative to foreign export prices raises the relative domestic price level for 
tradables, reducing q (a real appreciation in the present notation). A second international 
trade factor entering the real exchange rate reflects a comparison of the Japanese and 














−  Other things equal, a rise in Japanese 
import prices PM, for example, pushes up Japan’s tradable price level and causes real 
appreciation of the yen.













− , reflects the relative 
price of nontradable and tradable production, the focus of the HBS model. 
  A related calculation shows the role of the terms of trade in determining the 
(multilateral) real effective exchange rate, denoted qm. In essence this approach uses the 
calculation from Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007), assuming (purely for notational parsimony) 
that Japanese exports play a negligible role in the rest of the world’s tradable 
consumption, so that 
** /. TXM PPPE ==  In that case the real effective exchange rate is: 
                                                           
36 In models such as that of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007), * and 1/ 2, MX PE P α => so a rise in import prices 
implies real currency depreciation.   48
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This expression shows that, other things equal, a fall in the terms of trade (a rise 
in / M X PP ) feeds directly into multilateral real depreciation with an elasticity1( 1) γ α −−  
that is likely to be large.   
Taking the tradables share in the CPI to be γ = 0.25 in equation (7) and the export 














− ⋅ , and ascertain its contribution to the evolution of the overall 
bilateral real exchange rate. In constructing this variable, I use aggregate export and 
import price indexes for Japan, the United States, and Germany. 
  Figure 15a shows the result for yen/dollar pairing. (The figure graphs all variables 
in logs.) The constructed data for the log relative tradables price is positively correlated 
with the real exchange rate (the correlation coefficient is 0.40), but the series of 
international tradables prices is less volatile than the real exchange rate  – as was the 
overall terms of trade in comparison to the effective real exchange rate. When the relative 
tradables component is added to the HBS component graphed in Figure 12a to form a 
composite simulated real exchange rate, the fit is worsened compared to that of the 
tradables component alone (consistent with the findings of Engel 1999 for the U.S.).  
The figure illustrates how inaccurate are our temporary assumptions on the 
international pricing of tradable goods, which rule out internationally segmented markets   49
and the resulting pricing to market by imperfectly competitive manufacturing exporters. 
Although, at least some of the strong correlation between real exchange rates and terms 
of trade is due to nominal exchange rate movements driven by asset-market shocks, 
pricing to market tends to make the non-commodity terms of trade smoother than the real 
exchange rate in practice; see Atkeson and Burstein (2008) for a recent discussion. When 
the yen appreciates in nominal terms against the dollar, Japanese exporters lower the yen 
prices of exports relative to domestic sales, whereas U.S. exporters raise the dollar prices 
of their exports to partially exploit their enhanced competitiveness. Thus, in terms of 
equation (7), when E falls, the ratio 
* /. XX PP rises, muting (but not reversing) the impact 
of the nominal yen appreciation on the head-to-head competitiveness measure 
* /. XX EP P  
Were these pricing-to-market effects absent, the relative tradables price in Figure 15a 
would track the real exchange rate much more closely.  
Indeed, the two most glaring deviations in the figure are the endaka fukyo 
episodes of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Japanese exporters suffered compressed 
profits as they lowered yen export prices in the face of a sharply appreciating currency. 
In the Japan/Germany pairing in Figure 15b, the correlation between the relative 
tradables price and the real exchange rate is 0.62, considerably higher than in the U.S. 
case. But in addition, the HBS variable now actually improves the composite simulation’s 
ability to track the real exchange rate. Pricing to market behavior is still very evident, 
however, particularly during the euro’s sharp depreciation in the years immediately 
following its introduction. Once one allows for pricing to market, the large deviations 
between the real exchange rate and the HBS benchmark appear to be substantially 
accounted for (at least in a mechanical sense) by nominal exchange rate movements. One   50
would reach the same conclusion using equation (8) to construct the real effective 
exchange rate.  
While these results are illuminating, they do not provide a truly causal account of 
the yen’s evolution because the terms of trade and nominal exchange rate, like the real 
exchange rate, are endogenous and jointly determined, even at low frequencies. Only 
exogenous shocks to the terms of trade can be identified with confidence as causal drivers 
of the yen’s long-term evolution. 
  
Oil and the Yen 
  The leading candidate for an exogenous cause of the close correlation in Figure 
14 is the world price of energy. Over the last three decades, the share of mineral fuels in 
total Japanese imports has ranged from 50.6 percent in 1981 to 15.9 percent in 1995 and 
27.7 percent in 2007. Japan’s high dependence on energy imports compared to its many 
of its trading partners suggests several mechanisms through which world energy prices 
could affect the real exchange rate.
37  
Figure 16 shows monthly log levels of the yen price of oil in terms of Japan’s PPI 
and the effective yen real exchange rate based on normalized unit labor costs. Here the 
real exchange rate is plotted on an inverted scale, so that a move upward in the figure is a 
real depreciation. The data start in January 1978. The correlation coefficient between the 
two series, equal to –0.83, is remarkably high in absolute terms, indicating a strong 
tendency for the yen to be relatively weak when the price of oil is relatively high. 
                                                           
37 Amano and van Norden (1998) contend that oil prices Granger cause real exchange rates but not vice 
versa.   51
Evidently, an exogenous rise in the world price of oil causes a real yen depreciation.
38 
Observe, however, that the real oil price is several times more variable than the real 
exchange rate – indeed, much of the variability in Japan’s comprehensive terms of trade 
is due to energy, which currently carries a weight above 0.25 in the overall import price 
index published by Japan’s government.
 39  
Recently several papers have documented the strong effect of a dominant 
commodity export price on the exporter’s real exchange rate.
40 From this perspective, the 
yen appears to be a “commodity currency” on the import side. Although commodity 
terms of trade appear to be an important determinant of real exchange rates in broader 
samples of countries (see Ricci, Milesi-Ferretti, and Lee 2008),
41 the close link between 
the yen and energy prices evident in Figure 16 is especially striking. The main departure 
from the dominant pattern appears to be in the period from late 1997 to late 1999. Over 
those months, the yen first depreciated sharply under the pressure of low interest rates 
                                                           
38 Lane (2008) documents an empirical relationship between the real price of oil and the yen real exchange 
rate within an error-correction model. 
39 Rogoff (1992, p. 18) displayed a similarly high correlation for the period 1975-90, as did Amano and van 
Norden (1998) for 1973-1993 data. (The latter authors also show a high correlation for the deutsche mark, 
and present regression evidence consistent with their graphical findings. They interpret that evidence as 
showing that a 10 percent rise in the real oil price causes a 1.7 percent real yen depreciation.) What is 
remarkable is that the correlation shown by Rogoff and by Amano and van Norden has held up so well over 
many more years and several further cycles in the yen exchange rate. As noted above, the real oil price 
measure I use is the yen price of oil divided by the Japanese PPI. That variable is roughly congruent to the 
yen real exchange rate multiplied by the real dollar price of oil (in terms of a U.S. price index). One might 
worry that because my measure includes the log real yen exchange rate as an additive factor, it is not really 
exogenous with respect to the real exchange rate; furthermore, the close correlation in Figure 15 could in 
theory be driven mostly by variability in the real exchange rate. These theoretical possibilities are not 
significant in practice because the world oil price is so much more variable than the real exchange rate. The 
correlation between the real exchange rate and the real dollar price of oil (in terms of the U.S. CPI) is –
0.79, only slightly less in absolute value than the correlation cited in the text. Indeed, Rogoff (1992) 
graphed the bilateral real yen/dollar CPI exchange rate against the world price of oil in terms of the U.S. 
CPI. His discussion of the relation between the two variables focuses on HBS productivity effects. 
40 See, for example, Chen and Rogoff (2003) and Cashin, Céspedes, and Sahay (2004).  
41 See also Kohli and Natal (2008), who find no significant role for the HBS effect in determining the real 
exchange rate of the Swiss franc, but do detect a strong terms-of-trade effect.   52
and domestic financial turmoil while the price of oil fell in the backwash of the Asian 
crisis; afterward both the yen and the price of oil recovered lost ground. 
  Figure 17 graphs annual data on the real effective exchange rate (starting in 
1975), the overall terms of trade, and an “ex-oil” terms of trade measure adjusted to 
remove energy prices.
42 The terms of trade less energy are much less variable than the 
overall terms of trade, and, as is typical of industrial countries, much less variable than 
the real exchange rate (Atkeson and Burstein 2008). Indeed, it is apparent that 
fluctuations in energy prices are responsible for most of the variance in Japan’s terms of 
trade. The correlation between even the ex-oil terms of trade and the real exchange rate 
(in log levels) is high (0.56), but not as high as that between the overall terms of trade and 
the real exchange rate (0.77 in annual data). Thus, the oil price is an arguably exogenous 
variable with a quantitatively important impact on the real exchange rate. 
  While a broad-based deterioration in the terms of trade directly enters the real 
exchange rate through the first multiplicative factor on the right-hand side of equation 
(8), the same formula cannot be mechanically applied to the case of an energy-price 
increase. Taken alone, and absent changes in the prices of other tradable and nontradable 
goods, that shock might not have positive impact on the relative foreign price level for 
tradables, and therefore it might not result in a rise in qm (an effective yen depreciation). 
The root cause of the high correlation shown in Figure 16 is therefore likely to lie in other 
factors that transform the real exchange rate over time and move the nominal exchange 
rate in the short term. 
                                                           
42 Makoto Hosoya at the Price Statistics Section of the Bank of Japan graciously provided disaggregated 
historical data underlying the BOJ’s import and export price indexes. The component weights allowed me 
to strip out energy prices.   53
A primary mechanism through which energy prices could affect the long-run real 
exchange rate is through the HBS channel, which modifies the second multiplicative 
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and denote the world price of oil in terms of tradable goods by pO. With the simplifying 
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 To the extent that tradables are 
relatively energy intensive and nontradables relatively labor intensive, a rise in the energy 
price lowers the relative price of nontradables. If this effect operates asymmetrically 
across countries because, for example, Japanese manufacturing is more energy intensive 
than manufacturing abroad, a real depreciation of the yen would result. That mechanism 
works, however, by lowering manufacturing wages and is likely to play out only over 
time (though it might well affect long-term real exchange rate expectations immediately). 
In an analysis based on relative labor productivities (rather than TFPs), the effect of 
energy prices would work entirely through labor productivity. A rise in energy prices 
would lower relative labor productivity in the energy-intensive tradable sector and cause 
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would not alter Figures 12a or 12b at all, although some of the productivity changes 
shown would be attributable to changing energy prices. 
  The high correlation in Figure 16 plausibly also reflects other mechanisms 
operating in the short term.
 43 If wages are sticky and labor immobile in the short run 
between the economy’s sectors, a rise in energy prices raises production costs and 
potentially creates unemployment. In this circumstance, real yen depreciation can 
substitute for a reduction in wages, shifting world demand toward Japanese exports and 
shifting Japanese demand toward Japanese nontradables. Because an oil shock is a global 
shock, however, this mechanism relies on the fact that Japan is more energy-dependent 
than most other energy importers.
44 Other potential channels for energy prices (or 
commodity prices in general) to influence the real exchange rate rely on wealth effects, as 
postulated by Ricci, Milesi-Ferretti, and Lee (2008). If market participants view higher 
energy prices as permanent, they might also adjust their expectations of long-run capital 
intensity and possibly growth downward, with immediate repercussion on the real 
exchange rate.
45 Through myriad channels, the price of oil has had a decisive influence 
on the yen’s real exchange rate over the period of this study, with the yen generally 
depreciating when the real price of oil is rising and appreciating when it is falling. 
 
                                                           
43 These short-run effects are strengthened if monetary policy systematically responds expansively to 
increases in the oil price. 
44 Findlay and Rodríguez (1977) present a short-term Mundell-Fleming type model that can deliver this sort 
of result. 
45 Sachs (1983) explores a growth model with flexible exchange rates and energy inputs.  
 
   55
Secular Deterioration in Japan’s Terms of Trade 
 
Between 1988 and 2007, Japan’s comprehensive terms of trade declined by more 
than 54 percent (in log points).  The decline in the ex-energy terms of trade, at only about 
18 percent, is much less dramatic; see Figure 17. Much of the latter decline occurred after 
1994, and it has arguably contributed to the yen’s real depreciation since then.  Any 
definitive account of Japan’s terms of trade would require a close analysis of 
disaggregated import and export price and quantity data, an undertaking that is beyond 
the scope of this paper (but a very worthy area for future research). Here I simply offer a 
few observations and conjectures. 
IMPLICATIONS OF SLOWER GROWTH AND REDUCED INNOVATION. Slower growth 
and dynamism in Japan’s economy may have resulted in relatively more growth along the 
intensive than the extensive margin. Krugman (1989) has emphasized that growth in 
exports of new products need not depress the terms of trade, in contrast to growth at the 
intensive margin. Thus, a reduced pace of growth and innovation in Japan could 
contribute to declining terms of trade. 
An additional implication of slower growth is that imperfectly competitive 
Japanese exporters could have experienced declining market power in world markets, 
leading to lower export prices.  As noted above, pricing-to-market appears to be 
widespread in global markets for manufactures, a fact that has inspired theoretical 
analyses over more than two decades, ranging from Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman 
(1987) to Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Burstein and Jaimovich (2008). In a model of 
Bertrand competition among sellers, in which buyers have a constant elasticity of   56
substitution ε among varieties of a good, the markup charged by a monopolistic producer 
of a particular variety is given by 
 
where s  is the exporter’s global market share. Between 1993 and 2003, Japan’s share in 
world exports of manufactured goods declined from 12.5 to only 7. 5 percent (Gaulier, 
Lemoine, and Ünal-Kesenci 2007),
46 while Japan’s share in world income likewise 
declined. This dynamic would have led to lower markups over time; and with labor costs 
and markups both declining, export prices had to fall as well. Intuitively, the pricing 
decisions of a larger player have bigger effects on the global price index for the good, 
thereby reducing the perceived price elasticity of demand. As the Japanese economy 
shrank, Japanese exporters therefore perceived increasingly intense competition abroad. 
 C HANGING TRADE PATTERNS AND CHINA’S ROLE. China’s emergence as a leading 
exporter no doubt has numerous implications for Japan’s economy. Chinese export 
products display a surprisingly large overlap with those of OECD countries (Schott 2006; 
Amiti and Freund 2009; Wang and Wei 2009), so it is conceivable that the country’s 
rapid export growth has undercut the prices of Japanese exports. Coleman (2007) 
develops a global growth model in which such effects drive resource reallocation among 
trade partners. He argues that price and production trends in Asian-Pacific countries are 
broadly consistent with the model’s predictions. 
                                                           
46 Interestingly, and possibly relevant to the terms-of-trade trend, Japanese imports as a share of world 
imports declined by much less in percentage terms, from 5.1 to 4 percent. 
price (1 )
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  Japan’s trade patterns have indeed changed radically since the mid-1990s, with a 
general reorientation of its import and export trade toward Asia and significant changes 
in the composition of its trade. Japan now exports more parts and components and semi-
finished goods relative to capital goods, with much of the flow going to China for 
processing, assembly, and re-export. At the same time, Japan’s imports have swung 
toward parts and components and capital goods produced in China. These changes have 
been driven by a number of factors, including structural changes within Asia, greater 
regional integration, and the birth in 1995 of NAFTA, the trade-diverting effects of which 
have helped make North America less important in Japan’s trade.
47 
The implied terms of trade changes are not obvious a priori. Japanese exporters 
may have faced downward price pressure in the course of trade re-orientation, but 
China’s goods (including its exports to Japan) are priced quite competitively in world 
markets (Schott 2006). In light of the dramatic change in trade patterns, one must be 
cautious in interpreting movements in aggregate export or import price indexes, as 
emphasized by Weinstein and Broda (2009). One must also question even more strongly 
any identification of export prices with consumer prices for tradable goods. Eichengreen, 
Rhee, and Tong (2007) conclude that on balance, China’s export growth has had more 
important consequences important for low-income Asian countries than for higher-
income Asian countries such as Japan. 
  There is another important channel through which China’s torrid growth through 
mid-2008 affected Japan’s overall terms of trade: by pushing up global commodity 
prices, notably the price of energy. 
                                                           
47 Again, see Gaulier, Lemoine, and Ünal-Kesenci (2007).   58
Conclusion 
 
The recent history of the yen suggests prolonged departures from longer-run trends, 
especially with respect to the U.S. dollar. These departures cannot be explained reliably 
even after the fact, but they appear to be related to macroeconomic policy actions, both in 
Japan and abroad, and to market expectations of future policies. 
In Japan’s economic history after the generation and collapse of the great asset 
price bubble, the yen’s strong real appreciation in 1990-95 stands out as a pivotal 
episode. From the point of view of the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson theory, prior sectoral 
growth trends changed around this time, and it is doubtful that foreign exchange market 
participants were able to foresee these structural shifts. Against the United States, relative 
tradables productivity growth actually went into decline, whereas against Germany it 
leveled off, as Figures 12a and 12b show. To the extent that foreign exchange markets 
were mistakenly expecting a return to previous growth trends, the yen’s expected future 
real exchange rate could have been artificially high. Short-term monetary developments 
may have reinforced the latter stages of this appreciation, and trade tensions with the 
United States certainly played a role, as discussed above. In any case, the strong yen 
appreciation helped propel the Japanese economy into stagnation and deflation.  
The yen’s trend depreciation since early 1995 is more easily justifiable in terms of 
the underlying evolution of sectoral productivity growth and of overall growth in Japan 
and its trading partners. Japan’s terms of trade have declined along with the yen’s real 
exchange rate, and have contributed to the latter depreciation trend. Real yen depreciation 
after 1995 has to some degree bolstered the economy through export promotion, though   59
renewed trade friction with the United States remains a threat. The yen’s sharp 
appreciation late in 2008 in the midst of the global financial crisis, coupled with the 
collapse of the Asian and American markets for Japanese exports, has once again thrown 
Japan into deep recession. 
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Sources: Real Estate Institute of Japan and Global Financial Data. Land-price indexes cover Tokyo, 
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Figure 6:  Japan less US real long-term interest differential 
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Figure 7:  Japan less Germany real long-term interest 
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Figure 11a:  Bilateral Japan/US productivity growth comparison 















































Figure 11b:  Bilateral Japan/Germany productivity growth 
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Figure 12a:  Bilateral Japan/US productivity comparison and 
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Figure 12b:  Bilateral Japan/Germany productivity comparison 
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Figure 15a:  Bilateral Japan/US terms of trade adjustment and 
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Figure 15b:  Bilateral Japan/Germany terms of trade 
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Figure 17: Real effective exchange rate, overall terms of trade, 
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